I like to read mysteries. No surprise, I also watch lots of TV cop shows and mysteries.

Some good reads turn out to be not-so-good TV, and vice versa. Ian Rankin‘s Rebus mysteries and various of Peter Lovesey‘s are an example of the former, and, in my view at least, David Suchet’s Poirot is a lot more interesting and entertaining that Agatha Christie‘s (for that matter, so is Albert Finney‘s). The same is generally true of Leo McKern’s Rumpole of the Bailey compared to John Mortimer‘s.

Of course there are lots of good-good examples (the adaptations of P.D. James and Dorothy Sayers, which both read and play well, in part because the adaptations are just that, rather than renditions), and plenty of not-not (for example, again in my view, the MidSomer Murders series based on Caroline Graham‘s books—not, mind, that this stopped me from watching all 70+ episodes of the British series—and the VI Warshawski series based on Sara Paretsky‘s work, which somehow never drew me in despite the Chicago location).

Then there are TV shows that don’t have book counterparts, and for that matter aren’t exactly cop shows or mysteries. Barney Miller comes to mind, as does Hill Street Blues.

The trigger for today’s rumination, New Tricks, is one of those not-exactlys. The BBC describes New Tricks as a “drama series about an eccentric group of veteran police detectives reopening cold cases.” Which it is, but as is the case with much detective fiction, the plot is simply a maguffin to draw us into the characters and their relationships.

The backstory is this: a disgraced Detective Superintendent has shot a dog, and is working her way out the doghouse (sorry, couldn’t resist that) by leading a squad comprising three retired detectives—one who converses regularly with his dead wife, another a womanizing rule-bender who maintains cordial relationships with several ex-wives and their daughters, and an ex-alcoholic third who lives on the medication-honed mental edge between paranoid delusion and photographic memory.

It’s interesting how little TV watching these days is based on broadcast or cable schedules. We routinely time-shift using the Xfinity (ne Comcast) On Demand services, and we also do considerable binge watching. The first time we binged was back in the red-envelope days, the entirety of Jewel in the Crown over four intense evenings. The most recent efforts were re-watching the British House of Cards in preparation for the Netflix House of Cards. (Both series are superb.)

Usually, though, we don’t exactly binge; rather, we get into a particular show, and then watch one or two episodes per evening until we’ve used it up. That’s how we did MidSomer Murders a while back (despite its endless village fetes), then the excellent George Gently and Vera, and more recently the outstanding and very French Spiral (L’Engrenage).

Some shows we delve into for a while, and then put on hiatus when they become overwhelming or repetitive—the Danish series The Eagle and the inimitable Larry Sanders Show are in that category. That’s probably what would happen with The Phil Silvers Show, which my father loved, and recordings of which supposedly were destroyed in a fire. Your Show of Shows. Rowan and Martin’s Laugh-In.

But I digress. Friends told us about New Tricks, and so we went looking for it. A local PBS station supposedly is planning to air some of it, but we figured this was a show we should watch from the beginning, and so we wanted the earlier episodes.

Which finally brings me to the actual topic for today: What it took to find and watch New Tricks says a great deal about what needs to improve if the online-viewing marketplace is to succeed. Here’s how the quest went:

1. Xfinity On Demand. Searching isn’t easy through the TV: you need to move a cursor around letter by letter using the remote. Using the Xfinity app on a phone or tablet is much easier, since one can just type in a search term to find a show’s schedule. (The app can even tell the cable box to change channels!) Anyway, no luck—Comcast doesn’t have New Tricks.
2. Netflix. Of course the Comcast cable box doesn’t do Netflix (the fact that I said “of course” is telling—competition most definitely trumps consolidated customer convenience), so I had to switch to one of our two Netflix-enabled devices (the Sony BluRay player or the AppleTV, both connected to our home network), after first telling the TV to use the appropriate HDMI input. Search using the BluRay or AppleTV remote isn’t any easier than with the Comcast box, but at least the Netflix app has good search tools. However, it tells me that “New Tricks is unavailable to stream” (and then suggests George Gently or MidSomer Murders). So, no luck again.
3. Amazon Instant Video. That only works on the BluRay player, not the AppleTV, and its app is a bit awkward, so tired of moving the cursor around I go right to the Amazon website on a computer. No luck on Prime Instant Video, the flat-rate subscription service I get by being a Prime customer—but at least Amazon offers an alternative, albeit for streaming purchase (not rental) at $4 per episode or $20 per season. The 8 seasons available for streaming would cost me $160 that way, still cheaper than the $240 I’d pay for DVDs (except there’s a DVD lagniappe: Season 9 is available!).
4. Hulu (which I don’t subscribe to, so searched only for completeness): No luck.
5. I’d heard about a new site sponsored by MPAA, wheretowatch.org, and so figured it was worth a try. Unfortunately, there’s no search tool on that website; instead, it points me to six other search sites. Among those, Flixster and Movies.com return no results. Jinni tells me I can rent the DVD from Netflix. TV Guide tries to take me to a www.tvshowsondvd.com website, presumably so I will buy the DVD, but NBCUniversal’s network malware filter blocks the site with a scary popup message, and being a good network citizen I accept my colleagues’ judgment and don’t bypass the block. Zap2it points me to the $4/episode Amazon offering. Finally, TV.com tells me that I could have watched the show in October 2012 (but only on the BBC, in the UK). None of that is helpful.
6. Finally I do what I’d usually do first: use Google. The search term “new tricks tv streaming” brings up several links, many of them to copyright-infringing, pirate sites. However, the first link, the legitimate ovguide.com, takes me back to Amazon’s $4 offering. And the second is the mother lode: Idaho Public TV has several seasons of New Tricks available for public, free streaming.

Of course, I want to watch on the TV, not on my iPad. A little more technology solves this problem: I switch our TV’s input to the AppleTV box, start up a New Tricks episode on the iPad, and AirPlay almost automatically redirects the video and sound to our TV. Very cool. (Trying this on an Amazon-hosted show, however, I discover that in some cases, apparently for licensing reasons, Airplay weirdly plays the audio track on the TV set but the video on the iPad—why, I wonder, do that rather than Just Say No, or play everything on the iPad?)

Two observations.

• First, it can be really hard and confusing to find video material online. There’s no overall search engine that covers all sources, so far as I can tell—at least, no legitimate overall search engine. (Although Google found what I was looking for, even its results were incomplete, since it didn’t point me to the fee-per-episode Amazon offering, and unfortunately it also suggested several sites offering presumably illegal copies.) Even when one finds material, further searching is sometimes necessary; for example, the excellent cop show Vera has one season available on Netflix, but two on Amazon Prime Instant Video, which you’d never know if you stopped once you found it at Netflix.
• Second, technology remains as much an obstacle as an enabler. For routine TV viewing at home, we use six devices: Sony and Panasonic TVs, two Comcast/Xfinity Motorola cable boxes, a Sony BluRay player, and an AppleTV. (I supposed our iPads and iPhones should be on this list too. We have two each of those.) Three of the devices are plugged into separate HDMI ports on the TV, and two of them (plus the iOS devices) require connections to our home network, which is connected to Comcast. (As a fringe benefit—I suppose—the landline that’s also provided by Comcast displays caller ID on the TV set, at least when we’re using the cable box; that way we can ignore fundraising calls without looking at our phones. Even better, we get caller ID and voicemail for our landline on a smartphone app. Even when it’s being frustrating, technology can be cool. But I digress again.) Each TV-related device has a remote, with only partially overlapping functionality—for example, the BluRay’s remote can change the TV’s inputs and adjust volume (the Comcast remote can also change the TV’s inputs, albeit awkwardly) but the BluRay remote can’t change cable channels. The AppleTV remote can only control that device, so watching TV through the AppleTV almost always requires using two remotes, one to choose materials and pause the video on the AppleTV, and the other to adjust
  TV volume. When the technology all works, it’s very nice. When it doesn’t, debugging is a nightmare: pressing buttons on different remotes, jiggling cables, checking Internet connections, and so forth. We tried a universal remote for a while, with the same result: great when it worked, nightmare when it didn’t.

Complexity like this is unfortunate, frustrating, and counterproductive, but perhaps, barring change in the economy of entertainment, unavoidable. Sadly, it deters consumption, especially legitimate consumption. The usual ways out of this—common standards, competition on quality and price, such as returned somewhat to the music world—have so far proven elusive for online TV watching. That’s in part because providers and distributors are quite rationally trying to monetize the material they control, and making it easy for people to find other material, or to change sources, doesn’t achieve that. A true conundrum.

Meanwhile, New Tricks is great fun. We’ve just started Season 4…

It’s been an interesting few weeks:

• Facebook’s upcoming $100-billion IPO has users wondering why owners get all the money while users provide all the assets.
• Google’s revision of privacy policies has users thinking that something important has changed even though they don’t know what.
• Google has used a loophole in Apple’s browser to gather data about iPhone users.
• Apple has allowed app developers to download users’ address books.
• And over in one of EDUCAUSE’s online discussion groups, the offer of a free book has somehow led security officers to do linguistic analysis of the word “free” as part of a privacy argument.

Lurking under all, I think, are the unheralded and misunderstood resurgence of a sometimes triangular barter economy, confusion about different revenue models, and, yes, disagreement what the word “free” means.

Let’s approach the issue obliquely, starting, in the best academic tradition, with a small-scale research problem. Here’s the hypothetical question, which I might well have asked back when I was a scholar of student choice: Is there a relationship between selectivity and degree completion at 4-year colleges and universities?

As a faculty member in the late 1970s, I’d have gone to the library and used reference tools to locate articles or reports on the subject. If I were unaffiliated and living in Chicago (which I wasn’t back then), I might have gone to the Chicago Public Library, found in its catalog a 2004 report by Laura Horn, and have had that publication pulled from closed-stack storage so I could read it.

By starting with that baseline, of course, I’m merely reminiscing. These days I can obtain the data myself, and do some quick analysis. I know the relevant data are in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). And those IPEDS data are available online, so I can

(a) download data on 2010 selectivity, undergraduate enrollment, and bachelor’s degrees awarded for the 2,971 US institutions that grant four-year degree and import those data into Excel,

(b) eliminate the 101 system offices and such missing relevant data, the 1,194 that granted fewer than 100 degrees, the 15 institutions reporting suspiciously high degree/enrollment rates, the one that reported no degrees awarded (Miami-Dade College, in case you’re interested), and the 220 that reported no admit rate, and then

(c) for the remaining 1,440 colleges and universities, create a graph of degree completion (somewhat normalized) as a function of selectivity (ditto).

The graph doesn’t tell me much–scatter plots rarely do for large datasets–but a quick regression analysis tells me there’s a modestly positive relationship: 1% higher selectivity (according to my constructed index) translates on average into 1.4% greater completion (ditto). The download, data cleaning, graphing, and analysis take me about 45 minutes all told.

Or I might just use a search engine. When I do that, using “degree completion by selectivity” as the search term, a highly-ranked Google result takes me to an excerpt from a College Board report.

Curiously, that report tells me that “…selectivity is highly correlated with graduation rates,” which is a rather different conclusion than IPEDS gave me. The footnotes help explain this: the College Board includes two-year institutions in its analysis, considers only full-time, first-time students, excludes returning students and transfers, and otherwise chooses its data in ways I didn’t.

The difference between my graph and the College Board’s conclusion is excellent fodder for a discussion of how to evaluate what one finds online — in the quote often (but perhaps mistakenly) attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.” Which gets me thinking about one of the high points in my graduate studies, a Harvard methodology seminar wherein Mike Smith, who was eventually to become US Undersecretary of Education, taught Moynihan what regression analysis is, which in turn reminds me of the closet full of Scotch at the Joint Center for Urban Studies kept full because Moynihan required that no meeting at the Joint go past 4pm without a bottle of Scotch on the table. But I digress.

Since I was logged in with my Google account when I did the search, some of the results might even have been tailored to what Google had learned about me from previous searches. At the very least, the information was tailored to previous searches from the computer I used here in my DC office.

Which brings me to the linguistic dispute among security officers.

A recent EDUCAUSE webinar presenter, during Data Privacy Month, was Matt Ivester, creator of JuicyCampus and author of lol…OMG!: What Every Student Needs to Know About Online Reputation Management, Digital Citizenship and Cyberbullying.

“In honor of Data Privacy Day,” the book’s website announced around the same time, “the full ebook of lol…OMG! (regularly $9.99) is being made available for FREE!” Since Ivester was going to be a guest presenter for EDUCAUSE, we encouraged webinar participants to avail themselves of this offer and to download the book.

One place we did that was in a discussion group we host for IT security professionals. A participant in that discussion group immediately took Ivester to task:

…you can’t download the free book without logging in to Amazon. And, near as I can tell, it’s Kindle- or Kindle-apps-only. In honor of Data Privacy Day. The irony, it drips.

“Pardon the rant,” another participant responded, “but what is the irony here?” Another elaborated:

I intend to download the book but, despite the fact that I can understand why free distribution is being done this way, I still find it ironic that I must disclose information in order to get something that’s being made available at no charge in honor of DPD.

The discussion grew lively, and eventually devolved into a discussion of the word “free”. If one must disclose personal information in order to download a book at no monetary cost, is the book “free”?

If words like “free”, “cost”, and “price” refer only to money, the answer is Yes. But money came into existence only to simplify barter economies. In a sense, today’s Internet economy involves a new form of barter that replaces money: If we disclose information about ourselves, then we receive something in return; conversely, vendors offer “free” products in order to obtain information about us.

In a recent post, Ed Bott presented graphs illustrating the different business models behind Microsoft, Apple, and Google. According to Bott, Microsoft is selling software, Apple is selling hardware, and Google is selling advertising.

More to the point here, Microsoft and Apple still focus on traditional binary transactions, confined to themselves and buyers of their products.

Google is different. Google’s triangle trade (which Facebook also follows) offers “free” services to individuals, collects information about those individuals in return, and then uses that information to tailor advertising that it then sells to vendors in return for money. In the triangle, the user of search results pays no money to Google, so in that limited sense it’s “free”. Thus the objection in the Security discussion group: if one directly exchanges something of value for the “free” information, then it’s not free.

Except for my own time, all three answers to my “How does selectivity relate to degree completion?” question were “free”, in the sense I paid no money explicitly for them. All of them cost someone something. But not all no-cost-to-the-user online data is funded through Google-like triangles.

In the case of the Chicago Public Library, my Chicago property taxes plus probably some federal and Illinois grants enabled the library to acquire, catalog, store, and retrieve the Horn report. They also built the spectacular Harold Washington Library where I’d go read it.

In the case of IPEDS, my federal tax dollars paid the bill.

In both cases, however, what I paid was unrelated to how much I used the resources, and involved almost no disclosure of my identity or other attributes.

In contrast, the “free” search Google provided involved my giving something of value to Google, namely something about my searches. The same was true for the Ivester fans who downloaded his “free” book from Amazon.

Not that there’s anything wrong with that, as Jerry Seinfeld might say: by allowing Google and Amazon to tailor what they show me based on what they know about me, I get search results or purchase suggestions that are more likely to interest me. That is, not only does Google get value from my disclosure; I also get value from what Google does with that information.

The problem–this is what takes us back to security–is twofold.

• First, an awful lot of users don’t understand how the disclosure-for-focus exchange works, in large part because the other party to the exchange isn’t terribly forthright about it. Sure, I can learn why Google is displaying those particular ads (that’s the “Why these ads?” link in tiny print atop the right column in search results), and if I do that I discover that I can tailor what information Google uses. But unless I make that effort the exchange happens automatically, and each search gets added to what Google will use to customize my future ads.
• Second, and much more problematic, the entities that collect information about us increasingly share what they know. This varies depending whether they’ve learned about us directly through things like credit applications or indirectly through what we search for on the Web, what we purchase from vendors like Amazon, or what we share using social media like Facebook or Twitter. Some companies take pains to assure us they don’t share what they know, but in many cases initial assurances get softened over time (or, as appears to have happened with Apple, are violated through technical or process failures). This is routinely true for Facebook, and many seem to believe it’s what’s behind the recent changes in Google’s privacy policy.

Indeed, companies like Acxiom are in the business of aggregating data about individuals and making them available. Data so collected can help banks combat identity theft by enabling them to test whether credit applicants are who they claim to be. If they fall into the wrong hands, however, the same data can enable subtle forms of redlining or even promote identity theft.

Vendors collecting data about us becomes a privacy issue whose substance depends on whether

• we know what’s going on,
• data are kept and/or shared, and
• we can opt out.

Once we agree to disclose in return for “free” goods, however, the exchange becomes a security issue, because the same data can enable impersonation. It becomes a policy issue because the same data can enable inappropriate or illegal activity.

The solution to all this isn’t turning back the clock — the new barter economy is here to stay. What we need are transparency, options, and broad-based educational campaigns to help people understand the deal and choose according to their preferences.

As either Stan Delaplane or Calvin Trillin once observed about “market price” listings on restaurant menus (or didn’t — I’m damned if I can find anything authoritative, or for that matter any mention whatsoever of this, but  know I read it), “When you learn for the first time that the lobster you just ate cost $50, the only reasonable response is to offer half”.

Unfortunately, in today’s barter economy we pay the price before we get the lobster…

Who’s on First, Abbott and Costello’s classic routine, first reached the general public as part of the Kate Smith Radio Hour in 1938. It then appeared on almost every radio network at some time or another before reaching TV in the 1950s. (The routine’s authorship, as I’ve noted elsewhere, is more controversial than its broadcast history.) The routine can easily be found many places on the Internet – as a script, as audio recordings, or as videos. Some of its widespread availability is from widely-used commercial services (such as YouTube), some is from organized groups of fans, and some is from individuals. The sources are distributed widely across the Internet (in the IP-address sense).

I can easily find and read, listen to, or watch Who’s on First pretty much regardless of my own network location. It’s there through the Internet2 connection in my office, through my AT&T mobile phone, through my Sprint mobile hotspot, through the Comcast connections where I live, and through my local coffeeshops’ wireless in DC and Chicago.

This, most of us believe, is how the Internet should work. Users and content providers pay for Internet connections, at rates ranging from by buying coffee to thousands of dollars, and how fast one’s connection is thus may vary by price and location. One may need to pay providers for access, but the network itself transmits similarly no matter where stuff comes from, where it’s going, or what its substantive content is. This, in a nutshell, is what “network neutrality” means.

Yet network neutrality remains controversial. That’s mostly for good, traditional political reasons. Attaining network neutrality involves difficult tradeoffs among the economics of network provision, the choices available to consumers, and the public interest.

Tradeoffs become important when they affect different actors differently. That’s certainly the case for network neutrality:

• Network operators (large multifunction ones like AT&T and Comcast, large focused ones like Verizon and Sprint, small local ones like MetroPCS, and business-oriented ones like Level3) want the flexibility to invest and charge differently depending on who wants to transmit what to whom, since they believe this is the only way to properly invest for the future.
• Some Internet content providers (which in some cases, like Comcast, are are also networks) want to know that what they pay for connectivity will depend only on the volume and technical features of their material, and not vary with its content, whereas others want the ability to buy better or higher-priority transmission for their content than competitors get — or perhaps to have those competitors blocked.
• Internet users want access to the same material on the same terms regardless of who they are or where they are on the network.

Political perspectives on network neutrality thus vary depending on who is proposing what conditions for whose network.

But network neutrality is also controversial because it’s misunderstood. Many of those involved in the debate either don’t – or won’t – understand what it means for a public network to be neutral, or indeed what the difference is between a public and a private network. That’s as true in higher education as it is anywhere else. Before taking a position on network neutrality or whose job it is to deal with it, therefore, it’s important to define what we’re talking about. Let me try to do that.

All networks discriminate. Different kinds of network traffic can entail different technical requirements, and a network may treat different technical requirements differently. E-mail, for example, can easily be transmitted in bursts – it really doesn’t matter if there’s a fifty-millisecond delay between words – whereas video typically becomes jittery and unsatisfactory if the network stream isn’t steady. A network that can handle email may not be able to handle video. One-way transmission (for example, a video broadcast or downloading a photo) can require very different handling than a two-way transmission (such as a videoconference). Perhaps even more basic, networks properly discriminate between traffic that respects network protocols – the established rules of the road, if you will – and traffic that attempts to bypass rule-based network management.

Network neutrality does not preclude discrimination. Rather, as I wrote above, a network behaves neutrally if it avoids discriminating on the basis of (a) where transmission originates, (b) where transmission is destined, and (c) the content of the transmission. The first two elements of network neutrality are relatively straightforward, but the third is much more challenging. (Some people also confuse how fast their end-user connection is with how quickly material moves across the network – that is, someone paying for a 1-megabit connection considers the Internet non-neutral if they don’t get the same download speeds as someone paying for a 26-megabit connection – but that’s a separate issue largely unrelated to neutrality.) In particular, it can be difficult to distinguish between neutral discrimination based on technical requirements and non-neutral discrimination based on a transmission’s substance.In some cases the two are inextricably linked.

Consider several ways network operators might discriminate with regard to Who’s on First.

• Alpha Networks might decide that its network simply can’t handle video streaming, and therefore might configure its systems not to transmit video streams. If a user tries to watch a YouTube version of the routine, it won’t work if the transmission involves Alpha Networks. The user will still be able to read the script or listen to an audio recording of the routine (for example, any of those listed in the Media|Audio Clips section of http://www.abbottandcostello.net/). Although refusing to carry video is clearly discrimination, it’s not discrimination based on source, destination, or content. Alpha Networks therefore does not violate network neutrality.
• Beta Networks might be willing to transmit video streams, but only from providers that pay it to do so. Say, purely hypothetically, that the Hulu service – jointly owned by NBC and Fox – were to pay Beta Networks to carry its video streams, which include an ad-supported version of Who’s on First. Say further that Google, whose YouTube streams include many Who’s on First examples, were to decline to pay. If Beta Networks transmitted Hulu’s versions but not Google’s, it would be discriminating on the basis of source – and probably acting non-neutrally.

What if Hulu and Google use slightly different video formats? Beta might claim that carrying Hulu’s traffic but not Google’s was merely technical discrimination, and therefore neutral. Google would probably disagree. Who resolves such controversies – market behavior, the courts, industry associations, the FCC – is one of the thorniest points in the national debate about network neutrality. Onward…

• Gamma Networks might decide that Who’s on First ridicules and thus disparages St. Louis (many performances of the routine refer to “the St Louis team”, although others refer to the Yankees). To avoid offending customers, Gamma might refuse to transmit Who’s on First, in any form, to any user in Missouri. That would be discrimination on the basis of destination. Gamma would violate the neutrality principle.
• Delta Networks, following Gamma’s lead, might decide that Who’s on First disparages not just St. Louis, but professional baseball in general. Since baseball is the national pastime, and perhaps worried about lawsuits, Delta Networks might decide that Who’s on First should not be transmitted at all, and therefore it might refuse to carry the routine in any form. That would be discrimination on the basis of content. Delta would be violating the neutrality principle.
• Epsilon Networks, a competitor to Alpha, might realize that refusing to carry video disserves customers. But Epsilon faces the same financial challenges as Alpha. In particular, it can’t raise its general prices to cover the expense of transmitting video since it would then lose most of its customers (the ones who don’t care about video) to Alpha’s lesser but less expensive service. Rather than block video, Epsilon might decide to install equipment that will enable video as a specially provided service for customers who want it, and to charge those customers – but not its non-video customers – extra for the added capability. Whether an operator violates network neutrality by charging more for special network treatment of certain content – the usual term for this is “managed services” – is another one of the thorniest issues in the national debate.

As I hope these examples make clear, there are various kinds of network discrimination, and whether they violate network neutrality is sometimes straightforward and sometimes not.  Things become thornier still if networks are owned by content providers or vice versa – or, as is more typical, if there are corporate kinships between the two. Hulu, for example, is partly owned by NBC Universal, which is becoming part of Comcast. Can Comcast impose conditions on “outside” customers, such as Google’s YouTube, that it does not impose on its own corporate cousin?

Why do we give a shortstop (whose name, lest you didn’t read to the end of the Who’s on First script, is “darn”)? That is, why is network neutrality important to higher education? There are two principal reasons.

First, as mobility and blended learning (the combination of online and classroom education) become commonplace in higher education, it becomes very important that students be able to “attend” their college or university from venues beyond the traditional campus. To this end, it is very important that colleges and universities be able to provide education to their students and interconnect researchers over the Internet. This should be constrained only by the capacity of the institution’s connection to the Internet, the technical characteristics of online educational materials and environments, and the capacity of students’ connections to the Internet.

Without network neutrality, achieving transparent educational transmission from campus to widely-distributed students could become very difficult. The quality of student experience could come to depend on the politics of the network path from campus to student.To address this, each college and university would need to negotiate transmission of its materials with every network operator along the path from campus to student. If some of those network operators negotiate exclusive agreements for certain services with commercial providers – or perhaps with other colleges or universities – it could become impossible to provide online education effectively.

Second, many colleges and universities operate extensive networks of their own, or together operate specialized inter-campus networks for education, research, administrative, and campus purposes. Network traffic inconsistent with or detrimental to these purposes is managed differently than traffic that serves them. It is important that colleges and universities retain the ability to manage their networks in support of their core purposes.

Networks that are operated by and for the use of particular organizations, like most college and university networks, are private networks. Private and public networks serve different purposes, and thus are managed based on different principles. The distinction is important because the national network-neutrality debate – including the recent FCC action, and its evolving judicial, legislative, and regulatory consequences – is about public networks.

Private networks serve private purposes, and therefore need not behave neutrally. They are managed to advance private goals. Public networks, on the other hand, serve the public interest, and so – network-neutrality advocates argue – should be managed in accordance with public policy and goals. Although this seems a clear distinction, it can become murky in practice.

For example, many colleges and universities provide some form of guest access to their campus wireless networks, which anyone physically on campus may use. Are guest networks like this public or private? What if they are simply restricted versions of the campus’s regular network? Fortunately for higher education, there is useful precedent on this point. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which took effect in 1995, established principles under which most college and university campus networks are treated as private networks – even if they provide a limited set of services to campus visitors (the so-called “coffee shop” criterion).

Higher education needs neutrality on public networks because those networks are increasingly central to education and research. At the same time, higher education needs to manage campus networks and private networks that interconnect them in support of education and research, and for that reason it is important that there be appropriate policy differentiation between public and private networks.

Regardless, colleges and universities need to pay for their Internet connectivity, to negotiate in good faith with their Internet providers, and to collaborate effectively on the provision and management of campus and inter-campus networks. So long as colleges and universities act effectively and responsibly as network customers, they need assurance that their traffic will flow across the Internet without regard to its source, destination, or content.

And so we come to the central question: Assuming that higher education supports network neutrality for public networks, do we care how its principles – that public networks should be neutral, and that private ones should be manageable for private purposes – are promulgated, interpreted, and enforced? Since the principles are important to us, as I outlined above, we care that they be implemented effectively, robustly, and efficiently. Since the public/private distinction seems to be relatively uncontroversial and well understood, the core issue is whether and how to address network neutrality for public networks.

There appear to be four different ideas about how to implement network neutrality.

1. A government agency with the appropriate scope, expertise, and authority could spell out the circumstances that would constitute network neutrality, and prescribe mechanisms for correcting circumstances that fell short of those. Within the US, this would need to be a federal agency, and the only one arguably up to the task is the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC has acted in this way, but there remain questions whether it has the appropriate authority to proceed as it has proposed.
2. The Congress could enact laws detailing how public networks must operate to ensure network neutrality. In general, it has proven more effective for the Congress to specify a broad approach to a public-policy problem, and then to create and/or empower the appropriate government agency to figure how what guidelines, regulations, and redress mechanisms are best. Putting detail into legislation tends to enable all kinds of special negotiations and provisions, and the result is then quite hard to change.
3. The networking industry could create an internal body to promote and enforce network neutrality, with appropriate powers to take action when its members fail to live up to neutrality principles. Voluntary self-regulatory entities like this have been successful in some contexts and not in others. Thus far, however, the networking industry is internally divided as to the wisdom of network neutrality, and without agreement on the principle it is hard to see how there could be agreement on self-regulation.
4. Network neutrality could simply be left to the market. That is, if network neutrality is important to customers, they will buy services from neutral providers and avoid services from non-neutral providers. The problem here is that network neutrality must extend across diverse networks, and individual consumers – even if they are large organizations such as many colleges and universities – interact only with their own “last mile” provider.

Those of us in higher education who have been involved in the network-neutrality debates have come to believe that among these four approaches the first is most likely to yield success and most likely to evolve appropriately as networking and its applications evolve. This is especially true for wireless (that is, cellular) networking, where there remain legitimate questions about what level of service should be subject to neutrality principles, and what kinds of service might legitimately be considered managed, extra-cost services.

In theory, the national debate about network neutrality will unfold through four parallel processes. Two of these are already underway: the FCC has issued an order “to Preserve Internet Freedom and Openness”, and at least two network operators have filed lawsuits challenging the FCC’s authority to do that. So we already have agency and court involvement, and we can possiible congressional actions and industry initiatives to round out the set.

One thing’s sure: This is going to become more complicated and confusing…

Lou: I get behind the plate to do some fancy catching, Tomorrow’s pitching on my team and a heavy hitter gets up. Now the heavy hitter bunts the ball. When he bunts the ball, me, being a good catcher, I’m gonna throw the guy out at first base. So I pick up the ball and throw it to who?

Bud: Now that’s the first thing you’ve said right.

Lou: I don’t even know what I’m talking about!