Remember Attack Plan R? That’s the one that enabled Brigadier General Ripper to bypass General Turgidson and the rest of the Air Force chain of command, sending his bombers on an unauthorized mission to attack the Soviet Union. As a result of Plan R and two missed communications – the Soviets’ failure to announce the Doomsday Device and an encrypted radio’s failure to recall Major Kong’s B-52 – General Ripper ended the world and protected our precious bodily fluids, Colonel Mandrake’s best efforts notwithstanding.

Fortunately, we’re talking about Sterling Hayden, George C. Scott, Slim Pickens, and Peter Sellers in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, and not an actual event. But it’s a classic illustration why control of key technologies is important, and it’s the introduction to my theme for today: we’re losing control of key technologies, which is important and has implications for how campus IT leaders do their jobs. We can afford to lose control; we can’t afford to lose influence.

Here’s how IT was on most campuses until about ten years ago:

• There were a bunch of central applications: a financial system, a student-registration system, some web servers, maybe an instructional-management system, and then some more basic central facilities such as email and shared file storage.
• Those applications and services were all managed by college or university employees – usually in the central IT shop, but sometimes in academic or administrative units – and they ran on mainframes or servers owned and operated likewise.
• Students, faculty, and staff used the central applications from desktop and laptop computers. Amazing as it seems today, students often obtained their computers from the campus computer reseller or bookstore, or at least followed the institution’s advice if they bought them elsewhere. Faculty and staff computers were very typically purchased by the college or university and assigned to users. In all three cases, a great deal of the software on users’ computers was procured, configured, and/or installed by college or university staff.
• Personal computers and workstations connected to central applications and services over the campus network. The campus network, mostly wired but increasingly wireless, was provided and managed by the central IT organization, or in some cases by academic units.
• Campus telephony consisted primarily of office, dormitory, and “public” telephone sets connected to a campus telephone exchange, which was either operated by campus staff or operated by an outside vendor under contract to the campus.

Notice the dominant feature of that list: all the key elements of campus information technology were provided, controlled, or at least strongly guided by the college or university, either through its central IT organization or through academic or administrative units.

There were exceptions to campus control over information technology, to be sure. The World Wide Web was already a major source of academic information. Although some academic material on the web came from campus servers, most of it didn’t. There were also many services available over the web, but most campus use of these was for personal rather than campus purposes (banking, for example, and travel planning). Most campus libraries relied heavily on outside services, some accessible through the Web and some through other client/server mechanisms. And many researchers, especially in physics and other computationally-intensive disciplines, routinely used shared computational resources located in research centers or on other campuses. Regardless,  a decade ago central or departmental campus IT organizations controlled most campus IT.

Now fast forward to the present, when things are quite different. The first difference is complexity. For example, I described my own IT environment in a post a few weeks ago:

I started typing this using Windows Live Writer (Microsoft) on the Windows 7 (Microsoft, but a different part) computer (Dell) that is connected to the network (Comcast, Motorola, Cisco) in my home office, and it’ll be stored on my network hard drive (Seagate) and eventually be posted using the blog service (WordPress) on the hosting service (HostMonster) where my website and blog reside. I’ll keep track of blog readers using an analytic service (Google), and when I’m traveling I might correct typos in the post using another blog editor (BlogPress) on my iPhone (Apple) communicating over cellular (AT&T) or WiFi (could be anyone) circuits. Much of today’s IT is like this: it involves user-owned technologies like computers and phones combined in complicated ways with cloud-based services from outside providers. We’re always partly in the cloud, and partly on the ground, partly in control and partly at the mercy of providers.

Mélanges like this are pretty much the norm these days. And not just when people are working from home as I often do: the same is increasingly true at the office, for faculty and staff, and in class and dorms, for students. It’s true even of the facilities and services we might still think of as institutional: administrative systems and core services, for example.

The mélanges are complex, as I already pointed out, but their complexity goes beyond technical integration. That’s the second difference between the past and the present: not only does IT involve a lot of interrelated yet distinct pieces, but the pieces typically come from outside providers – the cloud, in the current usage. Those outside providers operate outside campus control.

Group the items I listed in my ten-years-ago list above into four categories: servers and data centers, central services and applications, personal computers and workstations, and the networks that interconnect them. Now consider how IT is on today’s campus:

• Instead of buying new servers and housing them in campus buildings, campuses increasingly create servers within virtualization environments, house those environments in off-campus facilities perhaps provided by commercial hosting firms, and use the hosting firm’s infrastructure rather than their own.
• A rapidly growing fraction of central services is outsourced, which means not only that servers are off campus and proprietary, but that the applications and services are being administered by outside firms.
• Although most campuses still operate wired and wireless networks, users increasingly reach “campus” services through smartphones, tablets, web-enabled televisions, and portable computers whose default connectivity is provided by telephone companies or by commercial network providers.
• Those smartphones, tablets, and televisions, and even many of the portable computers, are chosen, procured, configured, and maintained individual users, not by the institution.

This migration from institutional to external or personal control is what we mean by “cloud services”. That is, the key change is not the location of servers, the architecture of applications, the management of networks, or the procurement of personal computers. Rather, it is our willingness to give up authority over IT resources, to trade control for economy of scale and cost containment. It’s Attack Plan R.

The tradeoff has at least four important consequences. Three of these have received widespread attention, and I won’t delve into them here: ceding control to the cloud

• can introduce very real security, privacy, and legal risks,
• can undercut long-established mechanisms designed to produce effective user support at minimal cost, and
• can restructure IT costs and funding mechanisms.

I want to focus here on the fourth consequence. Ceding control to the cloud necessarily entails a fundamental shift in the role of central and departmental IT organizations. This shift requires CIOs and IT staff to change their ways if they are to continue being effective – being Rippers, Kongs, or Turgidsons won’t work any more.

Most important, cloud-driven loss of campus control over the IT environment means that organizational and management models based on ownership, faith, authority, and hierarchy – however benevolent, inclusive, and open – will give way to models based on persuasion, negotiation, contracting, and assessment. It will become relatively less important for CIOs to be skilled at managing large organizations, and more important for them to know how to define, specify, and measure costs and results and to negotiate intramural agreements and extramural contracts consistently. Cost-effective use of cloud services also requires standardization, since nothing drives costs up and vendors away quite so quickly as idiosyncrasy. Migration to the cloud thus requires that CIOs understand emerging standards, especially for database schemas, security models, virtualization, system interfaces, and on and on. It requires that CIOs understand that strength lies in numbers – especially in campuses banding together to procure services rather than in departures from the norm, however innovative.

Almost as important, much of what campuses now achieve through regulation they will need to achieve through persuasion – policy will give way to pedagogy as the dominant mechanism for guiding users and units. I serve on the operations advisory committee for a federal agency. To ensure data and program integrity, the agency’s IT organization wanted to revise policies to regulate staff use of personal computers and small mobile devices to do their work from home or while traveling. It became rapidly clear, as the advisory committee reacted to this, that although it was perfectly possible to write policies governing the use of personal and mobile devices, most of those policies would be ignored unless the agency mounted a major educational campaign. Then it became clear that if there were a major educational campaign, this would minimize the need for policy changes. This is the kind of transition we can imagine in higher education: we need to help users to do the right thing, not just tell them.

On occasion I’ve described my core management approaches as “bribery” and “conspiracy”. This meant that as CIO my job was was to make what was best for the university also be what was most appealing to individuals (that’s “bribery”), and that figuring out what was best for the university required discussion, collaboration, and agreement among a broad array of IT and non-IT campus leaders (“conspiracy”). As control gives way to the cloud for campus IT, these two approaches become equally relevant to vendor relations and inter-institutional joint action. We who provide information technology to higher education need to work together to ensure that as we lose control over IT resources we don’t also lose influence.

This is the third and final of my ruminations on this topic. Some years ago, about halfway through my UChicago CIOship, I wrote this:

…it is bad news when a dean at my university not only knows who I am and what I do, but doesn’t like it. Suppose the dean wants to buy nonstandard equipment through a nonstandard channel. On the university’s behalf, I object to those choices; I also believe that the entire purchase is unnecessary because the equipment would allow the dean’s school to duplicate existing services that the university provides centrally. The dean responds by arguing that the interests of individual schools should outweigh collective university interests, and that having a chief information officer — that’s me — serves no useful purpose. To the dean, my job seems to consist entirely of interfering in school affairs.

I quoted this passage from “A CIO’s Question: Will You Still Need Me When I’m 64?, a 2002 opinion piece in the Chronicle, in an EDUCAUSE presentation because it had gotten me in trouble. Although it was based on a particular dean in one institution, a different dean at a different institution thought it was about him, and wasn’t happy. The lesson I drew from that — that specificity is sometimes better than generality, and that readers identify with abstracted characters — remains important.

But that’s not my theme today. Rather, I want to revisit the arguments I made in “A CIO’s Question…”, and see how their validity has evolved. My core argument was that it remains important for colleges and universities to have a Chief Information Officer or CIO. By “CIO” I meant not necessarily someone with that exact title, but rather someone providing central, comprehensive leadership for the institution’s information-technology activities and policies.

Technologies have a lifecycle. Initial implementation often requires central initiative and guidance. In due course, however, many technologies mature sufficiently to no longer require central oversight. For example, “most colleges and universities now have pervasive networks,” I wrote, “accessible to everyone everywhere. Users interact directly with administrative and academic systems. E-mail, instant messaging, and cellphones are everyday tools. Information technology is a utility like electric power, available consistently and pervasively across most of higher education” — and therefore requiring crisp operational management rather than high-level leadership. I cited other examples of areas no longer requiring central attention: the promotion of instructional technologies, and the support of local computer users (more on that in my recent post “Help! I need somebody.“)

Yet there remain at least four good, interlinked reasons for colleges and universities to have CIOs, I wrote: properly integrating central systems, securing economies of scale in operations and procurement, promulgating and accepting standards to enable those first two, and advocating for strategic applications of IT across the institution’s academic and administrative domains.

These seem valid justifications for the CIO role today. Yet one hears challenges to traditional CIOship: distributing responsibility for IT across diverse separate entities, downgrading the role and importance of the CIO, and managing what remains of central IT as merely one utility among many.

It’s important to parse these trends carefully. What appears to be coherent movement in the wrong direction may actually be discrete movement in several right directions. Moreover, although it remains important that there be central leadership for institutional IT, it may no longer be important — or even feasible — that there be central control. (More on the demise of control in an upcoming post.)

As technologies mature, they enable decentralization. As the strategic importance of IT increases, it becomes dangerous for an institution to entrust it to a single individual, especially if that individual speaks the language of technology rather than the language of higher education, or if that individual is organizationally and geographically isolated. And a large fraction of IT is indeed a critical utility, one whose failure can jeopardize the institution, and so much of IT must be managed as such.

What appears to be the downgrading of IT may instead be an evolving recognition — however imperfect — of its increasing importance. Then again, it may be the downgrading of IT, or the political dilution of a CIO’s perceived power. We need to understand which is which: to think about the evolving CIO role thoughtfully rather than simplistically, rather than focus on its scope of authority, its precise location in organization charts, or its title and reporting line.

The challenge for a CIO is to ensure that his or her institution uses IT to its maximum long-term benefit. To achieve that, it’s important to hold onto what’s important in one’s particular institutional and technological context, while letting go of what isn’t.

This post, in somewhat modified and expanded form, appears as “Shrinking CIO?” in EDUCAUSE Review, vol. 46, no. 1 (January/February 2011)

My mother called a couple of weeks ago to say she was unable to use the Internet. She doesn’t make calls like this lightly – she’s a regular email user, does extensive research online about things ranging from food to politics to textiles, and learned to use instant messaging so she could stay in touch with her grandchildren. And she understands that her HP computer is connected to RoadRunner and thereby to the Internet. So this wasn’t just her being new to technology.

I figured that she must have somehow lost her network connection, and began walking her through some experiments (“Are the lights blinking on the modem?”, and so on). But I was over-analyzing the problem. To my mother, as to many users, the Internet isn’t a network. Rather, it’s the collection of sites and services she can reach through her web browser. The problem, it turned out, was that my mother had accidentally moved the Firefox shortcut off her desktop. No icon, no browser. No browser, no Internet. No Internet, get help.

My mother’s missing icon may seem a triviality, but it certainly wasn’t trivial to her, and I think the problem and how she handled it are instructive. Lots of services we take for granted these days don’t come from a single provider or involve a single application or technology. In fact, sometimes it’s not clear what’s a service, what’s an application, and what’s a technology. Mostly that works out okay. When it doesn’t, though, it’s very hard to figure out where the chain broke down. Even when we figure that out, it’s hard to get the provider that broke the chain to fess up and make things right.

Perhaps as a consequence, we IT folks get lots of calls like my mother’s from friends and relatives: “My printer stopped working. Can you tell me what to do?”, or “How come Aunt Jane didn’t receive my email?”, or “I just clicked on something in a website, and now my screen is full of pornography ads”, or “Is it safe to buy something from eBay?”, or “Can I get my email on my phone?”. Why, we wonder, are they calling us, and not whom they’re supposed to call?

That’s the text today’s rumination: What’s the right way to think about help desks?

I started typing this using Windows Live Writer (Microsoft) on the Windows 7 (Microsoft, but a different part) computer (Dell) that is connected to the network (Comcast, Motorola, Cisco) in my home office, and it’ll be stored on my network hard drive (Seagate) and eventually be posted using the blog service (WordPress) on the hosting service (HostMonster) where my website and blog reside. I’ll keep track of blog readers using an analytic service (Google), and when I’m traveling I might correct typos in the post using another blog editor (BlogPress) on my iPhone (Apple) communicating over cellular (AT&T) or WiFi (could be anyone) circuits.

Much of today’s IT is like this: it involves user-owned technologies like computers and phones combined in complicated ways with cloud-based services from outside providers. We’re always partly in the cloud, and partly on the ground, partly in control and partly at the mercy of providers. That’s great when it works. But when something doesn’t work, diagnosis can be fiendishly difficult – especially if one is 2,000 miles away and can’t see one’s mother’s screen.

My mother has a solution to this: she has a local kid on retainer, her “guru”. She calls him when something doesn’t work, and he comes over to diagnose and fix the problem. She called me because her guru was on vacation.

Why doesn’t my mother call the RoadRunner or HP help desks? She’s not alone in this: vendor help desks seem to be users’ last resort, rather than their first. Most of us would explain this in two words: “Silos” and “India”. Help desks grew up around specific technologies or applications. Users dealt with one help desk if their wired phone wasn’t working, another to straighten out a cellphone problem, another if their email was over quota, another to figure out how to do online journal transfers from their desks, another to tighten up computer security, and so on — hence, “Silos”. On the other end of the phone, service providers developed highly specialized help desks comprising inexpensive staff working from very specific databases of known problems and stock solutions (“India”).

This worked so long as technologies were actually separate. But in this age of everything connected to everything else, it doesn’t. Far too many help-desk interactions comprise a distant help-desk technician not finding the problem in the database, usually because the problem involves inter-application pathology. As a last but frequent resort, the help desk has the user reboot (or restore to factory specs, or whatever). Once users realize that help desks solve all problems with reboots, they don’t bother calling help desks. They reboot. When reboots don’t work, they call their friends and relatives.

We know how to fix this, right? Consolidate help desks, cross-train staff, and all will be well.

That hasn’t worked either. Cross-training staff to deal with complex inter-technology problems means we need really clever technology folks as help-desk staff, or even to divert developers and integrators to that task. Staff who rely on knowledge bases simply can’t cope with the typical cross-technology problem, as we know from the India silos. But hiring or diverting experts is expensive. To solve that problem, we implement first-tier triage, so that expensive staff only deal with expensive problems. But none of this works: there’s still too much rebooting, and users remain dissatisfied.

My mother has the right idea. Today’s help desks typically work for providers — be they commercial or internal to colleges and universities — and not for users. Help desks’ incentives are aligned with the providers’ bottom lines, not with understanding how their provider’s service fits into the user’s environment.

The solution, I propose, may be to have users own help desks.

What would that mean? In the typical college or university, there are help desks operated by service providers (both central and departmental), and there are help desks operated by non-provider departments. Users typically find the latter helpful and worthwhile, and complain extensively about the unresponsiveness of the former. The result is structural tension at the senior level between the overseers of non-provider help desks (typically deans) and overseers of provider help desks (typically a CIO, or whoever’s in charge of central IT). Usually the tension either goes unresolved or, especially when corporate-style consultants are involved, provider-based centralization wins.

Maybe that’s precisely the wrong answer. Perhaps campus IT service providers should not own help desks. Instead, colleges and universities might rely on entities close to users — administrative units, academic departments, centers, building management — to provide first-level support. Realigning help desks this way wouldn’t be easy. It would raise budgetary issues, governance issues, local-control issues, centralization issues. It would entail diseconomies of scale.

But help-desk staff would understand users’ circumstances holistically — much as my mother’s guru understands her environment . This would make them better IT diagnosticians and therapists. If users got better diagnosis and therapy for their IT problems, they’d be more productive. And those productivity gains might amply offset the increased costs of localized, realigned help desks.

Larry Kohlberg’s work, which I mentioned a couple of posts ago, was an example of what graduate students in my time called “Stage Quest”: the effort, following Jean Piaget’s work on cognitive development, to find and document inexorable stage sequences in all kinds of development, including political, organizational, and occupational. In due course it became clear that not all development occurs through an invariant succession of stages. Yet Stage Quest keeps creeping into all kinds of organizational thinking and advice, not least the piece I’m ruminating on today: “Follow the Money'” and Other Unsolicited Advice for CIOs, from 1999.

Over a recent weekend I learned how to drive this 1952 Ford tractor. It’s fun to drive vehicles other than one’s car — in high school, for example, I briefly drove a Greyhound bus around a parking lot (well, okay, it wasn’t actually Greyhound, since it was in Mexico, but it was the same kind of bus — and this was when diesel intercity buses still had manual transmissions) and a friend’s TR-3 with a gearshift one could pull out of the transmission. Later I drove small trucks across the country a few times, and a motorcycle maybe twice, and those little Disney cars, which, truth be told, seemed much faster and more exciting in Anaheim when I was a kid than our son found them when he tried them years later in Orlando.

But I digress. Driving a tractor turns out to be very different from all those other vehicles in one key respect: you pick your gear before you start out, and then you stick with it. If you want to change gears, you stop the tractor completely first, and start over. For a tractor to work without unexpected interruptions, you need to understand what the job is before you set out. If you stick with the wrong gear, the tractor stalls, and you fail.

Here’s my summary reflection on “Follow the Money…”: It’s too much based on Stage Quest, and not enough on a 1952 tractor. The article arose from a conversation with a longstanding CIO from another institution. “What advice,” he asked me, “would you give a new CIO?” We came up with a dozen categories:

• Ends justify means,
• Who’s the boss?,
• Blood is thicker than water,
• Round up the usual suspects,
• Espouse the party line,
• What’s the difference?,
• Silence is golden,
• Follow the money,
• Timing is everything,
• Consort with the enemy,
• Practice what you preach, and
• Be where you are, not where you were

The relative importance of voice and data networking has changed, and I was unduly optimistic about desktop support becoming simpler, but much of the advice remains sound — especially, as I wrote in Part I of CIOship, the advice to avoid hierarchical approaches to IT organization and its relationships with other campus entities, and to collaborate actively across institutional boundaries.

But, as I said above, the article seems in retrospect to be excessively based, albeit implicitly, on the Stage Quest assumption that CIOs face similar series of challenges in different institutions. This, in turn, implies that CIOs at early stages in the series can learn from those who have progressed to later stages. Yet it has become quite clear, especially over the past few years,  that higher-education CIOships come in distinct forms. Like the various jobs a tractor driver might tackle, each form of the job entails a different series of stages, and requires a different gear. Some CIOs are hired to clean up a mess, for example, some are hired to encourage IT-based innovation, some are hired to consolidate past gains, and some are hired to focus on a particular problem. What one might do to Consolidate will fail miserably if one’s job is Cleanup.

The advice missing from “Follow the money…” is this: it’s very important to know which CIO job one has, and therefore which suite of skills and actions — which gear, that is — the job requires. A CIO hired into a Cleanup job will succeed by doing different things than one hired into an Innovate job. Those require different approaches than Consolidate or Focus jobs. Advice, in short, must be taken only in context.

This may help explain the discomfort with CIOship evident in “A CIO’s Question: Will You Still Need Me When I’m 64?“, which I wrote five years later. I’ll revisit that in the next Reflections on CIOship post.

Having not been a CIO  for over a year, I’ve been thinking about the evolution of that role — whatever its associated title — in colleges and universities.

As some of you know, I’ve thought and written about CIOship before. In the spirit of Ruminations, I figured the right way to rethink about CIOship was to revisit how I’d thought about it before.

So in this and the next two posts I’ll revisit those earlier pieces, see whether they still make sense. Ignoring chronology, I start with a short piece from a collection in EDUCAUSE Review three years ago. My part was short, so I’ll just quote it in full.

The U.S. Military Academy is a highly centralized organization: an end-of-career superintendent manages a largely transient faculty and a hierarchical administration. Harvard, in contrast, is a highly decentralized organization: a president nudges and coaxes deans, who control most of the resources and who in turn nudge and coax department heads and faculty, who enjoy substantial autonomy.

Like most other colleges and universities, the University of Chicago operates between these extremes—or, more typically and problematically, tries to combine the two. The budget process is centralized, for example, but its product is a set of formulas outlining boundaries within which deans and vice presidents have great freedom. Similarly, the university claims to have centralized telecommunications procurement, but somehow cell phones aren’t included.

Even faculty hiring has both centralized and decentralized components, causing occasional tension between department heads and the provost’s office. Confusion results, especially regarding the processes for setting priorities, resolving conflicts, and negotiating trade-offs.

Senior leadership groups—an officers group, a deans group, and an executive budget committee—exist to resolve these tensions between decentralized and centralized goals and actions. To the extent that these groups evolve into collaborative teams, they work well for issues of general institutional importance. They work less well for issues that involve only a subset of units: IT and Facilities, with overlapping responsibilities for design and installation; intellectual and administrative units, with divergent goals for student life; or pairs of academic departments, with a need to exploit synergies. So I—like other vice presidents, as well as deans and colleagues—have lots of lunches at the Quadrangle Club, the standard place for University of Chicago administrators and faculty to conduct lunch meetings.

For those of us with sedentary habits and no willpower, lunch can be a problem. That’s especially true for me, since the Quad Club makes a delicious BLT wrap, which is in effect a handful of garnished bacon only minimally buffered by a thin wrapper—and I love bacon. Ordinarily, mindful of my waistline, I’d try to avoid Quad Club lunches. But who has lunch with whom—and, sometimes more important, who sees whom having lunch with whom and stops by the table—is very important to the university’s functioning.

An aggregation of dyadic administrative lunches helps us behave as though we are centralized, even as each of us jealously guards his or her decentralized authority. Our lunches don’t turn into negotiating sessions, and only rarely do concrete decisions emerge from them. Rather, lunches give us the opportunity to share thoughts, experiences, perspectives, enthusiasm, paranoia, gossip—the informal information about one another that enables us to negotiate, collaborate, complain, and respond appropriately when our domains do or should engage one another.

This coming year promises to be challenging at the university: an ambitious president, lots of new vice presidents, currents of organizational and cultural change, and many trade-offs to be negotiated. Some of these challenges will call for more centralization and others for more decentralization. Some will necessitate a lunch. In this, I think, we are typical. Bacon is good.

In addition to celebrating bacon, I proposed that  formal processes don’t suffice to manage colleges and universities, especially in times of change. A year later, the national economy fell apart as the credit bubble burst, and most institutions found themselves managing two kinds of change at once: the intellectual and programmatic expansion required by technological and social progress, plus the unwelcome shrinkage required to operate within drastically smaller and uncertain resources.

Some institutions have managed to adapt to these challenging circumstances without major dislocation. Others haven’t. It seems to me, based on lots of conversations with IT leaders from diverse institutions, that the existence of established, effective backchannel relationships is even more important in times of shrinkage than in times of growth.

Competition often dominates in times of growth. Competition really doesn’t require backchannels, in fact, backchannels can undercut competitive will. Shrinkage requires collaboration and negotiation, however, rather than competition. And collaboration and negotiation most definitely benefit from backchannels.

In other words, bacon is even more important today than it was in 2007. In the next episode: does it still make sense to follow the money?